If a Hollywood-esque fairytale ending was to happen, Nepal would’ve clinched the SAFF Championship 2021 trophy in their maiden final appearance. Against a side that they lost two recently, it could’ve been coupled as an act of sweet revenge. However, it was simply not bound to happen.
The seven-time winners eventually came out on top, sidelining the history chasers by three goals to nil. On a night where both sides relied on their assistant coaches to receive instructions, things seemed different than the last clash. Nepal looked increasingly proactive – and yielded some promise – before five minutes of struggle early in the second half swept them away.
While the scoreline might suggest otherwise, Nepal were comparatively more attack-minded and dynamic. The major difference between the two ties lied in the way Nepal approached India off the ball. While the first match was about being more cautious and pragmatic, the final saw Nepal press relentlessly. Which, in turn, was successful whenever India tried to build up from the back with short passes.
Let’s start with an instance that came fairly early in the match. As Pritam Kotal receives the ball from midfield, Rohit Chand jumps to press him. The thing worth noticing here is how Chand is approaching him with an angle that automatically covers the passing option behind him (as shown in the figure). Nepal pressed aggressively with three men upfront, and did not leave the nearby passing options vacant.
These kinds of pressures kept India’s efforts of playing out from the back, via Apuia, nullified. Hence, India often opted to go long via goalkeeper Gurpreet Singh Sandhu, which is exactly what happened in this case.
Now, let’s compare this approach to the one that Nepal took in the previous match against Igor Stimac’s side. The center-backs were allowed to have the ball, and Nepal preferred to defend only in a mid or low block. Instances of high and intense press were scarce, if not absent.
Let’s look at a movement that happened during the 13th minute of the group stage match. As soon as India get the ball, Nepal retract to make a 5-4-1 shape, instead of pressing the ball carrier. India, knowing the pattern of play by now, dropped their playmaker Brandon Fernandes deep, to collect and then advance (as shown below).
And, Brandon does exactly that. As the picture below shows, Nepal concentrated more on getting the shape right, rather than moving along to limit the opposition. This way, India found it easy in the middle part of the pitch, to switch play, since the midfielder always could get closer/ pass to the player free on the flanks. If you’re wondering why Nepal won fewer balls and only won it inside their own box/ in their half throughout the match, this is precisely the reason. India weren’t clinical with their supply to the final third, causing them to lose a lot of balls in and around the attacking phase.
Now, let’s compare another aspect of Nepal’s play: off-the-ball shape and movement. In the group stage match, Nepal’s emphasis of staying with a 5-4-1, and doing so rigidly, opened up spaces in the middle periodically. While India were not as clinical in terms of utilizing that space, they did try to exploit it. Since the center-backs were not pressed, they had access to make those line-breaking passes every now and then.
Like the instance below, where Shubhasish Bose sees the space, and a free Sunil Chhetri and passes the ball.
Chhetri slightly drops down, collects the ball. Notice how another midfielder is close to him, allowing him to do a quick one-two and get inside from inside the two central defenders. Although the Nepali center-backs were very alert and on a couple of occasions, made crucial tackles, India were allowed to execute these moves with the set-up that Nepal preferred to lay.
Now, let’s come to the final. Nepal not only marked spaces but blocked passing lanes in the process. The Nepali setup was more dynamic – India really had to work to create spaces.
Continuing the instance shown above, Nepal’s constant flexibility in quest of making 2v1 situations can be observed. When the center-back does not have an unmarked option left, he passes it to a wide player, who is also being approached by a marker. Off the ball, the forwards, quickly getting back, have the nearby passing options covered.
With these kinds of movement and schemes, Nepal were able to win the ball back in the opposition half, or around the center circle. In this case, the 2v1 was formed not only on the ball carrier but the passing options around him. Rohit Chand, as noticed by many, looked more involved in this match because he was doing the duty of winning the second ball, like this sequence. In fact, Chand was seen switching the flanks in a couple of occasions to win balls following instances like these.
Now that we’ve looked at the two departments that Nepal made a significant change in, let’s look at how they tried to build up.
In the first match against India, it was simple – Manish Dangi was the sole target man, and everyone that won the ball tried to find him. To Nepal’s disadvantage, a lot of those efforts came in the form of long balls which were either intercepted or overhit.
In the second match, the approach resembled how Almutairi’s team did it from the back. The build-up started from the keeper, through the central player that utilized pocket of spaces. This looked more effective than the hit-and-collect approach.
To analyze this, we’re looking at an instance from the 29th minute of the match, where nearly everything came as per Nepal’s intent. Nepal’s presence in the opposition half during the press forced India to commit more players inside their own half. This left spaces for Nepal to build up from the back in their own half. We can see four Nepali players around the ball, with no Indian player closing in on the carrier, neither the passing options.
Having more men allowed Nepal to break multiple lines easily. With spaces to make vertical as well as horizontal runs in the middle, Nepal found it easier to switch plays compared to the first game. Constant movement, in turn, made the opposition midfielders move out of their positions.
In addition to the creation and exploitation of spaces, Nepal were better at winning and laying second balls off in spaces. Nawayug receives the ball and lays off in space…
… just for Suman Lama to collect it. A sublime execution of the target-man play.
Notice, in the instance below, how Nawayug’s layoff acts as a trigger for Rohit Chand to quickly attack the box. In similar ways, Nepal were able to put their men in the box, working relentlessly to overload the Indian defenders even inside the box.
Hence, it happens in the instance we’re looking at. Although the cross was overhit and did not end up meeting the target the intent and improvement from the Nepali side was clear. Another, and the most important thing to notice here, is that Nepal were able to deploy players inside the box without showing tremendous vulnerabilities in the backline.
Overall, Nepal looked more offensive and tactically more astute in the second meeting. Not to forget, the first match was a testament of good defending – despite allowing chances, Nepal were centrally compact. Nepal were more top-heavy in the second and executed the plan well that showed attacking intent. However, a period of lapse in the final – the five minutes after the first half – and a lethal mistake that allowed Sunil Chhetri to finish in the lost match was all it took for Nepal to lose the games.
While it’d be a good story to tell – a tournament win in the first-ever final appearance, the more experienced, and the site that proved to be relatively more clinical, got the edge. Looking it from a tactical angle, this team with boys in their early 20s, capable of adapting to multiple approaches alongside Almutairi, have an exciting road ahead – provided they’re given what they need to be given.